On July 22-23, 2025, the U.S. House Financial Services Committee advanced two key Myanmar-related bills, marking a significant escalation in bipartisan legislative efforts to counter Myanmar’s military junta and support the democratic movement four years post-coup.
Bills Overview
H.R. 3190 – BRAVE Burma Act
Sponsor: Rep. Bill Huizenga (R-MI)
Co-sponsors: Betty McCollum (D-MN), Ann Wagner (R-MO), Seth Moulton (D-MA)
Introduced: May 5, 2025
H.R. 4423 – No New Burma Funds Act
Sponsor: Rep. Nikema Williams (D-GA)
Co-sponsor: Young Kim (R-CA)
Introduced: July 1, 2025
Key Provisions
BRAVE Burma Act – Core Elements
| π― Target Area | π Specific Action | π‘ Example |
| π State Enterprises | Sanctions on junta-linked businesses | Myanmar Timber Enterprise, Myanmar Gems Enterprise |
| π¦ Banking | Sanctions on Myanma Economic Bank | Freeze assets, block transactions |
| βοΈ Jet Fuel Sector | Target entities supplying aviation fuel | Companies refueling military aircraft |
| π IMF Restrictions | Limit Myanmar’s voting power increases | Prevent junta from gaining more influence |
| π₯ Diplomatic Role | Create Special Coordinator position | Dedicated State Dept. official for Myanmar |
| β° Time Extension | Extend BURMA Act 2022 by 2 years | Continue existing sanctions through 2027 |
No New Burma Funds Act – Core Elements
| π― Target | π Action | π‘ Impact |
| ποΈ World Bank | Continue funding pause | No new loans/grants to junta |
| π³οΈ U.S. Position | Use voice and vote against funding | Block multilateral financial support |
| π Timeline | Maintain 2021 coup response | Keep financial pressure since takeover |
BRAVE Burma Act
β PROS
- π― Targeted Approach: Focuses on military revenue streams, not civilians
- π Comprehensive Coverage: Addresses multiple economic sectors
- π€ Bipartisan Support: Shows unified U.S. stance
- ποΈ Institutional Framework: Creates permanent diplomatic position
- β° Extended Timeline: Provides sustained pressure through 2027
β CONS
- π Regional Cooperation Needed: ASEAN/China cooperation uncertain
- π οΈ Enforcement Challenges: Jet fuel provision requires robust monitoring
- βοΈ Limited Leverage: Sanctions may not change military behavior
- πΌ Economic Spillover: Could affect legitimate businesses
- π Time Factor: Democratic transition may take longer than sanctions timeline
π° No New Burma Funds Act
β PROS
- π« Clear Message: Prevents legitimization of junta
- πͺ Multilateral Impact: Influences other World Bank decisions
- π Proven Track Record: Builds on successful 2021 response
- π€ International Coordination: Aligns with other donor countries
β CONS
- π₯ Humanitarian Risk: May limit development aid to people
- ποΈ Infrastructure Gap: Reduces post-transition reconstruction capacity
- π Regional Alternative: China/AIIB may fill funding gap
- β±οΈ Timing Uncertainty: Unclear when restrictions would lift
Future Predictions
π Likely Outcomes (70-80% Probability)
ποΈ Legislative Process
- β House Passage: Both bills likely to pass House floor vote
- π€ Senate Consideration: May face scheduling delays but eventual passage likely
- π Presidential Signature: High probability of executive support
π International Impact
- π€ Allied Coordination: EU, UK, Canada likely to implement similar measures
- πΌ Business Response: Multinational corporations may increase Myanmar exit
- π¦ Financial Isolation: Banking sector restrictions to expand
Moderate Scenarios (40-60% Probability)
π― Sanctions Effectiveness
- π Military Revenue: 20-30% reduction in junta economic access
- β½ Jet Fuel Impact: Significant disruption to air force operations
- π° Alternative Funding: Junta seeks increased Chinese/Russian support
ποΈ Political Developments
- π³οΈ Opposition Unity: Sanctions provide diplomatic legitimacy to NUG
- π ASEAN Pressure: Regional bloc may increase diplomatic pressure
- π₯ Civil Society: Strengthened international advocacy networks
β‘ Low Probability, High Impact (20-30% Probability)
π Regime Change Scenarios
- π₯ Internal Military Split: Economic pressure accelerates junta fractures
- ποΈ Negotiated Transition: International pressure forces dialogue
- πͺοΈ Popular Uprising: Sustained protests gain momentum from foreign support
π Unintended Consequences
- ποΈ Institution Damage: Myanmar permanently excluded from international finance
- π¨π³ Chinese Dominance: Beijing becomes sole major economic partner
- π Humanitarian Crisis: Economic isolation worsens civilian conditions
Timeline Predictions
Short-term (6-12 months)
- ποΈ Q3 2025: House floor votes likely
- ποΈ Q4 2025: Senate committee consideration
- π Q1 2026: Presidential signature expected
Medium-term (1-3 years)
- πΌ 2026: Business exodus accelerates
- π 2027: International pressure peaks with BURMA Act extension
- π― 2028: Sanctions effectiveness evaluation period
Long-term (3-5 years)
- π 2028-2030: Potential transition negotiations
- ποΈ Post-2030: Reconstruction and reintegration planning
- π Ongoing: Regular sanctions review and adjustment
Strategic Recommendations
πΊπΈ For U.S. Policymakers
- π€ Strengthen Allied Coordination: Synchronize sanctions with partners
- π Enhance Monitoring: Improve enforcement mechanisms
- π¬ Maintain Dialogue: Keep channels open with civil society
- π― Target Refinement: Regular review of sanctions effectiveness
π For International Community
- π€ Multilateral Response: Coordinate through UN, ASEAN
- π° Alternative Support: Direct aid to civil society, refugees
- π’ Diplomatic Pressure: Maintain international attention
- βοΈ Accountability Mechanisms: Support ICC, national courts
ποΈ For Myanmar Opposition
- π€ Unity Maintenance: Coordinate messaging with international supporters
- π Data Collection: Document sanctions impact for policy refinement
- π¬ Advocacy Continuation: Sustain lobbying efforts
- π― Strategic Patience: Prepare for extended struggle
Impact Assessment Matrix
| π― Sector | π Impact Level | β° Timeline | π¨ Confidence |
| π¦ Military Banking | π΄ High | 3-6 months | π’ High |
| βοΈ Air Force Operations | π Medium-High | 6-12 months | π‘ Medium |
| π State Enterprises | π Medium | 12-18 months | π‘ Medium |
| π International Legitimacy | π΄ High | Immediate | π’ High |
| π° Development Funding | π΄ High | Ongoing | π’ High |
| π₯ Civilian Economy | π‘ Low-Medium | Variable | π΄ Low |
Impact Levels: π΄ High | π Medium-High | π‘ Medium | π’ Low
Confidence: π’ High | π‘ Medium | π΄ Low
